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Municipal Manifest Destiny: Constitutionality of 
Unilateral Municipal Annexations 
In June of 2012, North Carolina passed a bill ending the state’s 
more than fifty-year history of involuntary municipal annexations.1 
The bill’s passage followed years of grassroots efforts to eliminate 
this practice, which is also known as forced annexation or unilateral 
annexation.2 Under North Carolina’s repealed system, certain classes 
of municipal corporations could expand their borders, annexing 
territory not previously included in the municipality, without the 
approval of the residents of the newly annexed area.3 Political 
discourse on the subject was heated. Property owners adamantly 
opposed cities’ power to unilaterally impose higher property taxes. 
New annexees frequently complained about cities’ recurrent inability 
to provide sewer and other services within a reasonable period of 
time.4 
While opponents of unilateral annexation celebrated a victory in 
North Carolina, state and local political groups in other states who 
opposed the idea of unilateral annexation were left to deal with the 
problem in their own states.5 Meanwhile, proponents of broad 
municipal annexation powers—seeking to overcome urban blight 
and allow for more logical, managed city expansion—are advancing 
legislation to give municipalities more power to annex areas outside 
of their own boundaries.6 
 
 1. An Act to Require a Vote of the Residents Prior to the Adoption of an Annexation 
Ordinance Initiated by a Municipality, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 2012-11, available at 
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2011/Bills/House/PDF/H925v6.pdf; Marissa Jasek, Gov. Perdue 
Won’t Block Forced Annexation Changes, WWAY NEWSCHANNEL 3 (June 10, 2012), 
http://www.wwaytv3.com/2012/06/10/gov-perdue-wont-block-forced-annexation-changes. 
 2. See, e.g., STOP NC ANNEXATION COALITION, http://www.stopncannexation.com (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2012); Barbara Hunter, Involuntary Municipal Annexation: The Ugly Truth, FOUND. 
FOR ECON. EDUC. (Sep. 1, 2007), http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/involuntary-municipal-
annexation-the-ugly-truth. 
 3. N.C. GEN. STAT 160A-49 (2009) (repealed). 
 4. See Daren Bakst, Forced Annexation in N.C.: A Question-and-Answer Guide, JOHN LOCKE 
FOUND. (Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.johnlocke.org/acrobat/spotlights/spotlight-366-
_forcedannexation.pdf. See also, e.g., Darrick Ignasiak, Anti-annexation Group Reacts to Victory, THE-
DISPATCH.COM (May 30, 2012), http://www.the-dispatch.com/article/20120530/news/305309981. 
 5. See, e.g., CITIZENS FOR FREE NEB., http://www.freenebraska.net/cause.html (last 
visited Dec. 19, 2012). 
 6. See Bryan H. Babb & Stephen C. Unger, Setting the Annexation Record Straight: The Myth 
Underlying Annexation Reform in Indiana, 51-MAR RES GESTAE 36 (2008). 
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As proponents and opponents debate the advantages of 
expanding or limiting municipalities’ powers to unilaterally annex, 
the constitutional implications of such procedures are frequently 
ignored. Still, unilateral annexations involve elected representatives 
of one local government imposing the regulations and laws of that 
municipality without the input of either the residents of the 
annexation territory or their representatives.7 The practice raises 
concerns about “equal protection of the laws.”8 
This Comment will explore these constitutional implications, 
arguing that residents of new annexations are entitled to 
representation concerning the decision. Part I will provide a 
summary of the current state of municipal annexation in the United 
States, exploring the different methods that states use to modify the 
borders of their municipal corporations, along with these methods’ 
relative strengths and weaknesses. Part II will review the history of 
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause’s application to 
local government. Part III will argue that laws permitting unilateral 
municipal annexations, such as North Carolina’s system prior to its 
reform, violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal 
protection.9 Part IV will provide options for annexation systems that 
maintain the policy advantages of allowing a city to annex property 
over the objections of residents and property owners while 
complying with Equal Protection principles. In particular, this 
Comment supports quasi-legislative determination through regional 
governments or counties as the best alternative to unilateral 
annexations. 
Like Mexican nationals and Native Americans facing the 
seemingly unstoppable territorial aspirations of the United States’ 
westward expansion and manifest destiny, county residents facing 
annexation may feel threatened that municipal expansion will 
change their way of life. This Comment seeks to address how their 
rights can be respected so that residents can view municipal 
boundary change as a logical and fair political adjustment rather than 
municipal conquest. 
 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 9. North Carolina’s new system may also be unconstitutional because it gives property 
owners greater powers than other residents in approving annexations. However, the specific 
problems with the new system are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF STATE ANNEXATION METHODS 
Classifying the states’ various annexation procedures can be a 
complex and difficult task. No two states use identical annexation 
procedures, and many states allow for more than one method of 
annexation.10 Classification approaches vary in regards to (1) which 
entity must approve the annexations (e.g. the legislature, the 
municipality, the voters, etc.) and (2) if there is a vote, which 
residents are enfranchised to vote on the issue. For the purposes of 
this Comment, I will work from Frank Sengstock’s classifications, 
which group states by the body that ultimately approves the 
annexation.11 Frank Sengstock identifies five annexation method 
classifications: popular determination, legislative determination, 
quasi-legislative determination, judicial determination, and 
municipal determination.12 I will discuss these methods in order of 
which methods generally give the most representation to annexees, 
starting with the fullest representation. 
In discussing municipalities, it is important to distinguish the 
nature of a municipal government and a state agency. A state agency, 
such as might approve an annexation under quasi-legislative 
determination, is usually headed by commissioners who have been 
appointed by an elected body or official (e.g. the governor) in order 
to supervise some area of state administration.13 While 
municipalities are considered merely administrative arms of the state 
for purposes of the federal constitution, many states give municipal 
corporations broad powers within municipal borders.14 
Municipalities have varying forms of government, but generally have 
elected offices or bodies that serve legislative, executive, and judicial 
functions.15 Many states have codified municipalities’ independence 
by granting home rule to these municipalities, limiting the ways in 
which the state legislature may interfere with local self-
governance.16 Thus, municipalities are qualitatively distinct from 
other agencies in the state. 
 
 10. Jamie L. Palmer & Greg Lindsey, Classifying Sate Approaches to Annexation, 33 ST. LOC. 
GOV’T REV. 60, 60 (2001). 
 11. See generally FRANK S. SENGSTOCK, ANNEXATION: A SOLUTION TO THE METROPOLITAN 
AREA PROBLEM (1960). 
 12. Id. at 9. 
 13. E.g. Alaska’s Local Boundary Commission. See supra notes27–31 and accompanying text. 
 14. SANDRA M. STEVENSON, UNDERSTANDING LOCAL GOVERNMENT 9 (2003). 
 15. Id. at 18. 
 16. Id. at 24–26. 
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A. Popular Determination 
Under a system of popular determination, some combination of 
residents of the annexing municipality, the annexation area, and the 
local government from which the annexation area will be taken (e.g. 
the county) vote directly to approve the annexation.17 The voters in 
some jurisdictions are made up of residents, while others consist 
only of property owners. Some states require that voters in the 
annexation area must approve of the annexation independently.18 
Other states require approval by voters in both the municipality and 
the annexation area. In other words, the voters of the territory that 
would encompass the new city boundaries must approve the 
annexation.19 
B. Legislative Determination 
Some jurisdictions require that any change to municipal 
boundaries occur through special legislative acts.20 This approach is 
especially popular in New England, where states have generally 
already incorporated all of their land into townships.21 Because every 
resident is already part of a municipal government other than a 
county, annexation always involves de-annexing part of another 
municipality, making annexations in New England fairly rare.22 
However, occasionally the need for boundary change will cause the 
state legislature to act in order to redraw boundaries. State 
constitutional limitations on special legislation—legislation that 
affects only one small area or a limited number of individuals23—
frequently impose restrictions on the exercise of this method in most 
states.24 Some states have attempted to bypass such limits by 
 
 17. Palmer & Lindsey, supra note 10, at 61. 
 18. E.g., ALA. CODE § 11-42-2(4) (2008) (allowing only qualified electors who have lived 
within the proposed annexation territory to vote on annexation approvals). 
 19. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 9-4-4.9 (2004) (requiring a vote of residents of both the 
annexation area and the annexing municipality before an annexation becomes valid). 
 20. SENGSTOCK, supra note 11, at 9. 
 21. Palmer & Lindsey, supra note 10, at 62. 
 22. Greg Lindsey & Jamie Palmer, Annexation in Indiana: Issues and Options, Indiana 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Center for Urban Policy and the 
Environment, Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs 54 (Nov. 1998), available at 
https://archives.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/2450/567/112_Annexation_1998.pdf?sequence=3. 
 23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 982 (9th ed. 2009). 
 24. SENGSTOCK, supra note 11, at 9. 
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creating general laws that encompass only one municipality, but 
most courts reject this kind of maneuver. As a result of these 
restrictions, this option is unavailable in many states.25 
C. Quasi-Legislative Determination 
In a quasi-legislative jurisdiction, the state legislature delegates 
its power to approve or initiate boundary changes to an 
administrative agency, independent board, or non-judicial tribunal.26 
Sometimes the agency or board may function on a statewide 
level. Alaska provides a good example. Alaska’s system creates a 
Local Boundary Commission made up of five governor-appointed 
commissioners—four representing each of Alaska’s four judicial 
districts and one representing the state as a whole.27 The 
commission studies and establishes procedures for municipal 
boundary modification within the state,28 holds public hearings to 
determine whether a boundary change should occur,29 and proposes 
boundary changes to the state legislature.30 The commission’s 
proposal automatically becomes effective unless the state legislature 
acts to disapprove the resolution.31 
Other states have opted to create boundary commissions on a 
county or regional level. For example, each California county has a 
local agency formation commission (LAFCO), charged with 
“discouraging urban sprawl, preserving open-space and prime 
agricultural lands, efficiently providing government services, and 
encouraging the orderly formation and development of local agencies 
based upon local conditions and circumstances.”32 The exact 
composition of the commission varies, but generally includes elected 
officials from the city and county (such as city council members or 
county supervisors) along with members who are appointed by the 
other commissioners.33 The LAFCO is responsible for approving or 
 
 25. Id. at 9–10. 
 26. Id. at 33. 
 27. ALASKA STAT. § 44.33.810 (2012). 
 28. Id. § 44.33.812. 
 29. Id; see also id. § 44.33.826. 
 30. Id. § 44.33.812; see also id. § 44.33.828. 
 31. Id. § 44.33.828. 
 32. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 56301 (West 2012). 
 33. TAMI BUI & BILL IHRKE, IT’S TIME TO DRAW THE LINE: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO LAFCOS 23 
(2d ed. 2003), available at http://www.calafco.org/docs/TimetoDrawLine_03.pdf. 
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denying all boundary changes for municipalities and the majority of 
local special districts after conducting a review of the proposed 
changes, holding public hearings, and in some cases putting the 
proposal to a public vote.34 
D. Judicial Determination 
Frequently, the judiciary plays a visible role in the ultimate 
approval of a municipal annexation, but “[r]arely do legislative 
guidelines give courts the power to assess substantive issues, such as 
the prudence or equity of an annexation.”35 A judge’s role is 
generally limited to verifying that annexation procedures have been 
adequately followed.36 
Virginia’s municipal annexation system is an exception. It 
establishes a three-judge panel to approve annexations, making 
substantive decisions about the propriety of the annexation. Either a 
citizen, or more frequently, the annexing city, may file suit in the 
annexation court, initiating the judicial review.37 The Virginia 
system reflects the state’s unique municipal structure. Unlike most 
states, Virginia’s cities do not form a part of the county in which 
they reside.38 Therefore, every annexation by a city or a town 
requires that the surrounding county lose part of its territory, and 
perhaps more importantly, its tax base. 
E. Unilateral Municipal Determination 
A few states give broad annexation powers to municipal 
governments, allowing them to freely annex unincorporated territory 
or smaller incorporated municipalities, all with little or no 
involvement by annexed residents, landowners, or their elected 
representatives.39 Until 2012, opponents of this method generally 
cited between five and seven states as examples of unilateral 
 
 34. Id. at 18–22. 
 35. Palmer & Lindsey, supra note 10, at 62. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Andrew V. Sorrell & Bruce A. Vlk, Virginia’s Never-ending Moratorium on City-
County Annexations, VA. NEWS LETTER, Jan. 2012, at 1–2, available at 
http://www.coopercenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Virginia%20News%20Letter%202
012%20Vol.%2088%20No%201.pdf. 
 38. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INDIVIDUAL STATE DESCRIPTIONS: 2007, at 296 (2012), available 
at http://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/isd_book.pdf. 
 39. See infra notes49–53 and accompanying text. 
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municipal annexation.40 Although North Carolina has since changed 
its procedures to place final approval—or more accurately, a veto 
power41—with annexed property owners, Delaware,42 Idaho,43 
Kansas,44 Nebraska,45 Tennessee,46 and Texas47 still give some 
municipalities fairly wide discretion to annex by city ordinance or 
other city action without the approval of landowners or residents. 
Additionally, several other states give municipalities power to 
unilaterally annex “islands,” or areas surrounded by the municipality 
on all sides.48 
Since the fall of the North Carolina system, Nebraska is probably 
the state that most strongly demonstrates the full extent of 
unilateral annexation power. Nebraska gives broad powers of 
unilateral annexation to its incorporated municipalities, the extent of 
which depends on the size and classification of the city. All 
incorporated municipalities may annex contiguous urban or 
suburban land by city ordinance, which is accomplished by a vote of 
the city council.49 Additionally, cities of the primary class—those 
 
 40. See Bakst, supra note 4. 
 41. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-58.64 (West 2012). (“After the adoption of the 
resolution of intent under this Part, the municipality shall place the question of annexation on 
the ballot.”). 
 42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §§ 101–101A (2011) (requiring various levels of approval for 
annexations by municipalities with 50,000 residents or more, but making no such requirement 
for other municipalities). 
 43. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-222 (2009) (giving municipal governments the power to carry 
out annexations without consent if the area contains fewer than 100 private ownerships and in 
which subdivisions of land are no more than five acres). See also Crane Creek Country Club v. 
Boise, 826 P.2d 446, 448 (Idaho 1990) (upholding the involuntary annexation of a country club). 
 44. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-520 (2011) (allowing the city to perform some annexations 
without prior approval of the county planning commission and without approval of landowners); 
see also Robert W. Parnacott, Annexation in Kansas, 70-DEC J. KAN. B. ASS’N 28, 28 (2001) (briefly 
explaining Kansas’ annexation process). 
 45. See infra notes49–53. 
 46. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-51-102 (2011) (giving municipalities sole discretion to annex 
territory in some situations). 
 47. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 43.021, 43.052 (West 2008) (giving municipalities 
power to annex areas identified by their own annexation plan three years after adding the area to 
the plan). 
 48. CAL GOV’T CODE § 56375.3 (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT ANN. § 31-12-106 (West 
2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-36-92 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-2-4502 (2011); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 268.660 (West 2012) (permitting municipalities to annex areas wholly 
surrounded by the annexing city without resident approval and according to the municipality’s 
discretion). 
 49. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 14-117, 15-104, 16-117, 17-405 (2012). 
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with more than 100,000 residents50—may by an act of city council, 
annex both adjacent villages and unincorporated urban or suburban 
land.51 Cities of the metropolitan class—those with 300,000 or more 
residents52—may further annex any municipality with fewer than 
10,000 residents.53 None of these annexations require the approval 
of the annexees. 
The advantages and disadvantages of unilateral annexations are 
hotly contested. Supporters point to the need to bring 
unincorporated areas within a municipality’s borders in order to plan 
future urban growth and account for untaxed city service benefits to 
residents just outside the city’s borders.54 Giving residents or 
landowners the ability to unilaterally block the annexation of their 
territory “unwisely elevate[s] and declare[s] inviolable the wishes of 
a few residents to the possible detriment of the interests of the 
broader municipality.”55 Further, objections to annexation 
frequently are objections to additional taxes that follow becoming a 
part of a municipality. But unincorporated suburbs and urban areas 
frequently benefit from the services available through the 
municipality, and “nonresidents on the fringe should no more have 
the power to opt out of the responsibilities of urban life than should 
city residents be able to claim an exemption from taxes to support 
services they do not use.”56 Unilateral annexation allows 
municipalities at the heart of a metropolitan area to tax surrounding 
areas that have benefited from the city’s services and growth, 
providing for the central city’s logical future growth. 
Although there are plenty of reasons to allow cities the freedom 
to plan their own growth and to tax those that benefit from their 
 
 50. Id. § 15-101. 
 51. Id. § 15-104. 
 52. Id. § 14-101. 
 53. Id. § 14-117. 
 54. See, e.g., Laurie Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, 24 URB. LAW. 247, 
253–54 (1992) (“[N]onresidents avoid paying their proportionate share of two significant city 
expenses: [city services used by the resident and services for the poor.]”); Karen E. Ubell, Recent 
Development, Consent Not Required: Municipal Annexation in North Carolina, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1634, 
1635–36 (2005) (citing a North Carolina commission report predicting that without the ability 
to annex, cities cannot provide municipal services required for sound development). 
 55. Reynolds, supra note 54, at 266. 
 56. Id. 
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services, opponents of unilateral annexation point to a number of 
other problems that unilateral annexations either fail to solve or 
exacerbate. First, it is unclear that giving municipalities unilateral 
annexation power actually creates more universally beneficial growth 
patterns.57 Municipalities acting in their own interests generally seek 
to annex areas with high property values, generating higher tax 
revenues while requiring fewer municipal services, at the expense of 
poorer areas, which cost municipalities more in services and yield 
little tax revenue.58 Furthermore, many metropolitan areas include 
several municipalities, either as suburban areas have incorporated to 
avoid annexation by the city in the past, or simply because 
historically separate municipalities have grown into each other. 
Giving municipalities the power to annex territories unilaterally 
according to their own interests encourages municipalities to engage 
in land grabbing.59  
A municipality may be motivated to annex as much area as 
possible in order to prevent neighboring municipalities from staking 
a claim to that territory, even if it is unclear how that territory will 
be used in the immediate future. 
Next, in a system like Nebraska’s, which allows larger 
municipalities to not only annex unincorporated land, but also 
allows for the unilateral annexation of smaller municipalities, many 
of the benefits of local government are potentially lost. Local 
governments, especially smaller governments, give citizens the 
ability to participate in a level of government where they fully 
perceive and appreciate the value of their vote and their impact on 
government.60 Larger governments are frequently slower to respond 
to small concerns, such as the placement of stop signs or individual 
land use, whereas small governments give citizens a vehicle by which  
 
 
 57. SENGSTOCK, supra note 11, at 23. 
 58. Id; see also generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 931 (2010) (arguing that because annexation decisions are driven by tax revenue, poor 
communities of minorities are excluded from annexations). 
 59. SENGSTOCK, supra note 11, at 24; see also, e.g., City of Elkhorn v. City of Omaha, 725 
N.W.2d 792 (Neb. 2007). The litigation between Elkhorn and Omaha involved a dispute over 
the annexation procedures of the two cities. Omaha announced plans to annex Elkhorn while 
Elkhorn sought to immunize itself against annexation by raising its population above 10,000. Id. 
at 868–69. As a result, the two cities engaged in a race to annex enough territory to accomplish 
their respective goals. Id. 
 60. See infra notes 174–77 and accompanying text. 
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to influence decisions that may affect a small number of people, but 
have a profound impact on those whom they do affect. 
II. EARLY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT AND BOUNDARY CHANGE 
Although scholars and activists frequently concern themselves 
with the myriad policy considerations that help determine the 
frequency and methods of municipal annexations, there are relatively 
few sources that study the constitutional issues that arise when 
considering municipal boundary change. But local governments play 
an increasingly important role in creating and implementing policy 
in addition to their traditional role of delivering services. Because of 
this, each state must assure that the annexation process does not 
“deny to any person within [the State’s] jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws,”61 when considering annexation policies. 
The role of the Fourteenth Amendment in municipal boundary 
change depends largely on the federal Constitution’s reach into 
matters of local government. The Supreme Court set the tone for 
discussion of the Constitution’s relationship to local government 
early in the 20th century in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh.62 Residents of 
the City of Allegheny, a smaller city bordering Pittsburgh, objected 
to the merger of Allegheny and Pittsburgh.63 In a referendum of all 
voters in the would-be combined municipality, an overwhelming 
majority of Allegheny residents voted to reject the proposed 
annexation, but a majority of Pittsburgh residents voted in favor of 
merger.64 Plaintiffs, residents of Allegheny, argued that the merger 
unconstitutionally deprived the City of Allegheny of its property and 
gave it to Pittsburgh without due process of law.65 The Court 
concluded that the municipal corporation itself was entitled to no 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, declaring that 
“[m]unicipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, 
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the 
governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them.”66 In 
other words, because the municipality is but a part of the state in the 
 
 61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 62. 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 167–68. 
 65. Id. at 168–69. 
 66. Id. at 178. 
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eyes of the federal Constitution, the municipality as a unit did not 
have any rights to defend under the federal constitution. The Hunter 
Court further explained, “The number, nature and duration of the 
powers conferred upon these corporations . . . rests in the absolute 
discretion of the state.”67 
Although Hunter declared that a municipal corporation is a mere 
subdivision of the state, a municipality is not immune to obligations 
under the Constitution. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, black residents of 
Tuskegee, Alabama, were excluded from the city after a redrawing of 
municipal boundaries.68 The mayor of Tuskegee invoked Hunter as a 
defense, claiming that States have broad powers to change the 
political boundaries of their subdivisions.69 The Court, however, 
responded that the State’s broad power to change political 
boundaries does not exempt the state from complying with 
constitutional requirements.70 In concluding that Tuskegee’s 
boundary changes might have violated the Constitution,71 the Court 
relied on the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition against denying the 
right to vote on account of race instead of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In his concurring opinion, Justice Whittaker argued 
that the decision should have been based on Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection. There was no evidence that former residents of 
Tuskegee had been denied a right to vote in light of the Fifteenth 
Amendment because black and white voters had the same rights 
within the municipality: 
[I]nasmuch as no one has the right to vote in a political division, or 
in a local election concerning only an area in which he does not 
reside, it would seem to follow that one’s right to vote in Division 
A is not abridged by a redistricting that places his residence in 
Division B if he there enjoys the same voting privileges as all others 
in that Division, even though the redistricting was done by the 
State for the purpose of placing a racial group of citizens in Division 
B rather than A.72 
 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
 69. Id. at 342. 
 70. Id. at 342–43. 
 71. The issue came before the Court on a motion to dismiss, so the Court did not actually 
consider the validity of the action, only whether the suit could be maintained based on the 
allegations. Id. at 340–41. 
 72. Id. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring). 
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Instead, Whitaker argued that the new boundaries reflected an 
attempt to segregate races in violation of Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection.73 
The Court soon turned to the Fourteenth Amendment to decide 
issues of state and local voting rights in Reynolds v. Sims.74 Until 
1962, questions of state and local representation were considered 
primarily non-justiciable political questions.75 The Court opened up 
questions of state representation to judicial review in Baker v. Carr. 
Baker ruled that political redistricting of federal congressional 
districts presented questions of Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection and that districts must reflect proportional 
representation.76 In Reynolds, the Supreme Court applied the equal 
protection principles established in Baker to representation in state 
government. The Court struck down Alabama’s system of 
apportionment to the state legislature,77 which resulted in 
disproportionate representation whereby residents in some districts 
enjoyed five times the voting power as residents of other districts.78 
The Court ruled that a state voting system must give each person’s 
vote roughly equal weight to that of another voter:79 “[T]he 
fundamental principle of representative government in this country 
is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without 
regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a 
State.”80 
Reynolds had a sweeping effect on state representation. States 
were suddenly required to change constitutional procedures in order 
to comply with the new “one person, one vote” principle recognized 
in Reynolds. Despite Hunter’s broad declaration that local governments 
acted as agents of the state, and are thus not subject to similar 
constitutional standards, some scholars predicted that the Reynolds 
standard would apply to local governments as well.81 As predicted, 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 75. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962). 
 76. Id. at 207–08. 
 77. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 537–39. 
 78. Id. at 569. 
 79. Id. at 567. 
 80. Id. at 560–61. 
 81. E.g., Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Counties and 
Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 23 (1965) (“There is strong reason to 
believe that the apportionment standards which apply to states also apply to those 
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shortly after Reynolds, the Court applied the one person, one vote 
standard to county governments in Avery v. Midland County.82 There, 
county commissioners were selected through elections from four 
county districts.83 One district entirely encompassed the county’s 
single municipality, while the other three districts were entirely 
rural.84 As a result, representation on the county board greatly 
favored rural residents.85 The Court held that the principle of one 
person, one vote “reaches the exercise of state power however 
manifested, whether exercised directly or through subdivisions of 
the State.”86 In later decisions, the Court extended Fourteenth 
Amendment requirements to other forms of local government, such 
as school boards87 and municipal bond districts.88 
III. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 
The Reynolds line of cases opened up state and local governments 
to federal judicial scrutiny. Consequently, when a state statute 
“substantially burdens fundamental rights . . . or where the statute 
employs distinctions based on certain suspect classifications . . . 
strict scrutiny applies and the statute will be upheld on the equal 
protection challenge only if the state can show that the statute is 
narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.”89 
This section will argue that unilateral annexations violate 
principles of Equal Protection by denying representation in a 
decision with far-reaching effects to a group of people based only on 
 
municipalities that (1) exercise general governmental functions and (2) are designed to be 
controlled by the voters of the geographic area over which the municipality has jurisdiction.”). 
 82. 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
 83. Id. at 476. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 479. 
 87. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (overturning election 
procedures that granted the franchise to property tax payers or parents with children enrolled in 
school). 
 88. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (holding that the city could not 
restrict a municipal bond election to property tax payers since non property owners were also 
affected). 
 89. Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2003). See also Kramer, 395 U.S. 
at 627–28 (“[W]hen we are reviewing statutes which deny some residents the right to vote, the 
general presumption of constitutionality afforded state statutes and the traditional approval 
given state classifications if the Court can conceive of a ‘rational basis’ for the distinctions made 
are not applicable.”). 
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where they happen to live. I will show that for an annexation 
procedure to comply with constitutional requirements, final 
discretionary authority must be vested in an entity or an electorate 
that represents the interests of all residents within the proposed new 
boundaries of the municipality. 
Representation in state and local government is a fundamental 
right.90 As such, any state legislation that denies the right to 
representation in important decisions is subject to strict judicial 
scrutiny.91 Since unilateral annexations give no representation in the 
annexation process to residents of the annexation area, strict 
scrutiny applies, and legislation delegating annexation powers to 
municipal governments is unconstitutional because there are 
alternative methods to achieving the government’s intelligent growth 
objectives. 
A. Representation as a Fundamental Right 
Since prior to the Revolutionary War, American values hold that 
representation in local government is a fundamental right. The 
American colonists were pushed to revolution in part because of 
their discontent with their lack of representation in parliament.92 
Citizens of several colonies established local governments and 
required that representatives to those governments be residents of 
the area they represented.93 Because of their tradition of 
representation in local government, the colonists became 
accustomed to—and indeed saw as their right—representation in 
every important decision. They expected such decisions to be made 
by people who represented them not in a form of “virtual 
representation,” but directly by people who had been elected from 
among their own.94 In the colonists’ view, the prevailing notion that 
elected members of parliament represented non-electors stood in 
 
 90. See infra Part III.A. 
 91. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626–27 (1969). See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942) (applying strict scrutiny to a law that would have denied some persons the right to 
procreation). 
 92. 1 BERNARD BAILYN, PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 1750–1776, at 91–98 (1965). 
 93. This was most notably true in the New England colonies, where townships regularly 
held town hall meetings to make important decisions. Although these meetings were open, the 
decisions were ultimately made by the people’s representatives, who were elected from among 
the districts they represented. Id. 
 94. Id. at 94–96. 
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opposition to basic notions of liberty and right.95 The importance of 
representation as a fundamental right is reflected in the Declaration 
of Independence, stating that governments “deriv[e] their just 
powers from the consent of the governed.”96 The rebelling colonists 
further complained that King George had denied certain 
accommodations “unless those people would relinquish the right of 
Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and 
formidable to tyrants only.”97 The constitutional requirement that 
individual states provide a republican form of government also 
implicates this fundamental right, at least tangentially.98 
Although Reynolds looked specifically at the election of 
representatives and therefore focused primarily on the right to vote, 
the Court emphasized the idea of representation generally: “As long 
as ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures 
are those instruments of government elected directly by and directly 
representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free 
and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system.”99 By 
apportioning representatives in such a way that some districts 
represent significantly more people than others, individual votes in 
districts with more residents were diluted compared to individual 
votes in districts with fewer residents.100 In essence, because of the 
voting process, state legislatures were not equally representative of 
all citizens of the state, and therefore, not all citizens were equally 
protected. 
Representative democracy rests on the foundational principle 
that, although decisions are not necessarily made by a direct vote of 
all citizens, “democratic government means government by consent 
 
 95. Id. at 96. 
 96. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 97. Id. at para. 5. 
 98. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 4. The Supreme Court has held that the responsibility for 
enforcement of the Guarantee Clause rests with Congress and not the courts. Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 849, 849 
(1994). As a result, there is little jurisprudence addressing this issue, but the idea that 
representation is essential in a republican form of government has been argued at least since the 
mid-19th century. E.g. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 20 (1849) (Argument of Plaintiff in Error) 
(“The institution of American liberty is based upon the principles, that the people are capable of 
self-government. . . . This is especially true of the several States composing the Union, subject 
only to a limitation provided by the United States Constitution, that the State governments shall 
be republican.”). 
 99. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). 
 100. Id. 
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of the governed.”101 Fundamentally, any decision that deprives a 
citizen of some freedom must ultimately derive its authority from 
the citizens of the jurisdiction, be it directly through a referendum of 
the people or indirectly through the citizens’ elected representatives. 
For example, new taxes are occasionally approved through 
referendum.102 Although some people—likely those who would pay 
the most under the new tax—will invariably oppose it, those who 
have been outvoted have had their vote counted. The opponents’ 
votes carry weight equal to those voting for the measure. Likewise, if 
a tax were passed by a state legislature, those opposing the measure 
can have their voices heard through their representatives. It is true 
that any one individual’s representative might vote against the 
individual’s interest, but as long as representation follows principles 
of one person, one vote, then the constituent has the same power as 
any other member of the district by voting to keep the representative 
in office or to remove her. Thus, any single citizen’s influence on the 
question is equal to that of any other citizen. There is a direct line of 
representation flowing from the voter through his representative to 
the decision-making body. 
B. Unilateral Annexations Deny Some People the Right to Representation 
When a municipality seeks to unilaterally annex an area of 
unincorporated county territory or another municipality, the right to 
representation is violated because the decision makers do not derive 
their authority from those who are brought under the city’s control.  
While municipalities are often referred to as administrative arms of 
the state, 103 there are significant differences between state agencies 
and municipalities. An agency receives its authority to act from the 
state, and agency decision-makers are elected or appointed by elected 
officials.104 This creates a stark contrast to the municipality. Like the 
agency, the municipality’s authority comes from the state. However, 
 
 101. Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 
U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 342 (1993). 
 102. E.g., in 2012, voters in California were asked to approve a temporary increase of 
income taxes and sales taxes through a ballot initiative. Cal. Sec’y of State, TEXT OF PROPOSED 
LAWS 80–84 (2012), available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/text-proposed-laws-
v2.pdf. 
 103. RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW 69 (7th ed. 2009). 
 104. See infra notes150–56 and accompanying text. 
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unlike the agency, municipal decision-makers are elected only by 
residents of the municipality. Consequently, while all state citizens 
are represented by agency officials, only residents of the municipality 
are represented by municipal officials. Only the interests of those 
living within the city boundaries before annexation are represented 
throughout all stages of the annexation process. 
Fourteenth Amendment protections for representation do have 
their limits. In Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, Tuscaloosa exercised 
police jurisdiction over Holt, a neighboring unincorporated 
community, without giving residents of Holt a right to vote in 
municipal elections.105 The powers exercised included the authority 
to issue licenses, enforce building codes, and enforce traffic laws,106 
but did not include the powers to levy ad valorem taxes, assert 
eminent domain, or zone property.107 In upholding the Alabama law 
granting extraterritorial powers to Tuscaloosa, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that “a government unit may legitimately restrict the right 
to participate in its political processes to those who reside within its 
borders.”108 At first blush, it seems that Holt might allow states to 
give municipalities broad control over extra-territorial residents. 
However, the court noted that the constitutionality of the state’s 
delegation of power was, at least in part, because the state had 
delegated only limited extraterritorial powers to the city.109 The 
court observed that other states delegate a far broader set of powers 
to cities to regulate extraterritorial areas, and specifically declined 
“to imply that every one of them would pass constitutional 
muster.”110 
In the case of annexations, Holt is not strictly on point for at least 
two reasons. First, the Court explicitly allowed for restrictions on 
the right to vote for persons living outside the municipality’s 
borders, but annexations are different because, unlike the 
community of Holt, annexation areas become part of the annexing 
city. While annexation territories fall outside the municipality’s 
borders at the beginning of the annexation process, by the time the 
process is complete, the annexation area will fall inside the territorial 
 
 105. 439 U.S. 60, 61–62 (1978). 
 106. Id. at 82 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. at 72 n.8. 
 108. Id. at 68. 
 109. Holt, 439 U.S. at 72 n.8. 
 110. Id. 
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borders of the new municipality. Annexations that give decision-
making power solely to a municipal government or to the popular 
vote of the annexing city deny the franchise regarding an important 
decision affecting residents (annexation) to a group of people merely 
because they happen to live in the newest part of the city.111 In 
Reynolds, the Court determined that state policies giving rural areas 
disproportionate voting power violated principles of equal protection 
because granting some voters a weightier vote “merely because of 
where they happen to reside, hardly seems justifiable,”112 and that 
“[t]o say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another 
would . . . run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic 
government . . . .”113 The Court does not specifically address the 
right to representation on its own, but the inherent right to 
representation is implicit in the Court’s analysis of the voting power 
to elect representatives. 
Second, Holt partially turned on the fact that the powers granted 
to the municipality were limited,114 but annexations are different 
because they involve an area coming under the complete jurisdiction 
of a general-purpose government. The Court has consistently held 
that general-purpose governments are subject to its Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence.115 The Fourth Circuit incorporated some 
of this line of reasoning in deciding that city annexations implicate 
constitutional rights. In Hayward v. Clay, a South Carolina state law 
required the approval of landowners before an annexation could go 
forward.116 In order to streamline the process, the landowners’ 
referendum and the annexation election were held 
simultaneously.117 The court found that the system impermissibly 
granted additional power to property owners without 
justification.118  
The court noted that giving some classes of people an additional 
right to vote could be permissible in elections of special interest, but 
“[a] change in the entire structure of local government is a matter of 
 
 111. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1963). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 563–64 (omissions in original) (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)). 
 114. See supra notes106–10 and accompanying text. 
 115. See supra Part II. 
 116. 573 F.2d 187, 188 (4th Cir. 1978). 
 117. Id. at 189. 
 118. Id. 
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general interest. Annexation will affect municipal services that every 
citizen receives . . . [and] ‘not only involves changes in taxation, 
police, and fire protection, sanitation, water, sewer and other public 
services, but brings about a complete change in the form of 
municipal government itself.’”119 If an election for an annexation 
presents constitutional concerns for voting, it makes sense that 
similar constitutional concerns would apply when a state limits 
representation. 
C. Unilateral Annexations Do Not Survive Strict Scrutiny 
Since unilateral annexations deny a fundamental right to a group 
of people, the law can only stand if the state can show that the law 
promotes a compelling state interest and is necessary to promote 
that interest.120 Unilateral annexation laws generally address the 
needs of municipalities to raise revenues and promote intelligent 
growth patterns.121 If municipalities fail to address these needs, 
cities may become blighted, lacking municipal funding to address 
poverty and the needs of an aging city in which wealthy residents 
flee the city in favor of the suburbs.122 Therefore, a court could 
reasonably find that unilateral annexations promote a compelling 
state interest. 
However, the variety of other methods of annexation lead to the 
conclusion that unilateral annexation laws are not necessary to 
address those needs. In applying strict scrutiny, courts must ask, “Is 
a particular infringement of constitutional rights, measured by its 
nature and scope, justifiable in light of the benefits likely to be 
 
 119. Id. at 190 (quoting the opinion of the trial court). 
 120. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626–27 (1969). In other 
contexts, particularly cases involving suspect classifications, the Court uses the more familiar 
three-step, “narrowly tailored” language for strict scrutiny. E.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 
904 (1995) (“Laws classifying citizens on the basis of race cannot be upheld unless they are 
narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state interest.”). Cases involving voting rights using 
this language generally also involve racial classifications. E.g., id. The distinction between the 
language used in Kramer and other cases is irrelevant here because, as will be demonstrated, 
unilateral annexations are “unnecessary” under Kramer’s potentially less-exacting standard, and 
it is therefore unnecessary to ask the question of whether the law is “narrowly tailored.” 
Likewise, the question of whether annexation methods are the least restrictive means of 
achieving the compelling state interest is unnecessary because, at least in this case, it is 
subsumed by the question of whether the method is necessary. 
 121. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
 122. Id. 
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achieved and the available alternatives?”123 As will be discussed in 
Part IV of this Comment, the state can achieve its most fundamental 
goals, including allowing municipalities to annex territory despite 
the lack of direct consent of the annexation area, without denying 
residents a right to representation in the decision. 
D. Decisions Dealing Directly with City Annexations 
The Supreme Court has never directly applied the Equal 
Protection Clause to city annexations, but several lower courts have 
decided the issue. In their decisions, lower courts have 
misinterpreted Hunter’s allocation of power to the state in a way that 
undermines the rights of residents in annexation proposals. For 
example, in Baldwin v. City of Winston-Salem the Fourth Circuit ruled 
that North Carolina’s statute granting broad powers of municipal 
annexation did not violate constitutional requirements.124 After 
discussing the broad powers granted to states under Hunter, the 
circuit court declared that a state’s decisions regarding annexations 
are “subject to judicial review under the Fourteenth Amendment 
only where that exercise involves the infringement of fundamental 
rights or the creation of suspect classifications.”125 However, in 
upholding the statutory scheme, the Fourth Circuit ignored one of 
its key flaws: delegation of authority to a body not elected by the 
residents of the annexation area. Hunter declares that the State can 
modify boundaries as it pleases.126 It makes no mention of the 
State’s ability to delegate that power to a body that in no way 
represents the interests of the citizens involved in the annexation. 
Nearly two decades later, the Fourth Circuit took up North 
Carolina’s controversial annexation statutes again in Barefoot v. City of 
Wilmington, realizing a similar result.127 The plaintiffs, a group of 
residents and homeowners of an area annexed by an ordinance 
adopted by the city council of the city of Wilmington, claimed that 
North Carolina had denied the right to vote on city annexations to 
some through the statutory annexation process while granting the 
right to other areas through special legislation.128 The court rejected 
 
 123. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1267, 1272 (2007). 
 124. 710 F.2d 132, 135 (4th Cir. 1983). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907). 
 127. 306 F.3d 113, 121 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 128. Brief for Appellant at 11–12, Barefoot v. City of Wilmington, 306 F.3d 113 (4th Cir. 
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the claim on a basis similar to the Baldwin court’s reasoning—
namely that “there is no basis for an equal protection claim when no 
one is granted the right to vote on the matter of [a particular] 
annexation”129—but further explained that the state legislature’s 
decision to allow for some annexations to occur without a vote while 
conferring a right to vote in others reflected the legislature’s 
judgment to “wisely limi[t] the exercise of its powers to the needs at 
hand.”130 The Fourth Circuit never considered—and the annexed 
residents never argued—that granting the annexation power to the 
Wilmington City Council, made up of people for whom the residents 
of the annexation area did not vote, had violated the fundamental 
right to representation. 
A number of other circuit courts, state supreme courts, and state 
appellate courts have also dealt with the issue, but most have 
resolved the issue by rejecting a fundamental right to put the 
annexation to a vote,131 settling claims under state restrictions on 
delegation of legislative power,132 rejecting claims based on takings 
in violation of due process,133 or simply citing the state’s broad 
powers to modify boundaries under Hunter.134 These cases have not 
dealt directly with the theory of unconstitutionality based on a denial 
of representation that I present in this Comment. Even if they had, 
the Supreme Court’s silence on the issue of unilateral annexations 
means that highest court in the land could decide the issue 
differently.135 
IV. OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO ANNEXATION WITHOUT VIOLATING 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
Proponents of intelligent municipal growth may believe that 
forcing states to give representation to annexees will impede the 
 
2002) (Nos. 01-1185, 01-2191). 
 129. Barefoot, 306 F.3d at 122 (quoting Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 
1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 130. Id. at 123. 
 131. See, e.g., Kane v. City of Beaverton, 122 P.3d 137, 139–40 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) 
(“[T]here is no fundamental right to vote on municipal annexations.”). 
 132. See, e.g., In re Annexation Ordinances, 117 S.E.2d 795, 802 (N.C. 1961). 
 133. See, e.g., id. at 805. 
 134. See, e.g., City of Millard v. City of Omaha, 177 N.W.2d 576, 579–80 (Neb. 1970) 
(resolving Fourteenth Amendment claims by quoting Hunter at length). 
 135. Residents of annexation areas have petitioned for and been denied certiorari to the 
Supreme Court on the issue. See, e.g., Barefoot v. City of Wilmington, 306 F.3d 113 (4th Cir. 
2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 538 (2002) (mem.). However, denial of certiorari does not imply an 
upholding of the decision. United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1922). 
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ability of municipalities to implement policies that will help solve 
problems associated with sprawl. However, “[t]hat the buses run on 
time cannot justify a dilution of any citizen’s right to vote.”136 As 
this Comment has demonstrated, Constitutional protections of equal 
protection and general democratic principles of representation 
prevent unilateral annexations, by vote or by action of a municipal 
government that does not represent the annexation territory. 
However, this does not mean that constitutional principles must 
necessarily trump the policy advantages obtained by unilateral 
annexation. 
Before its demise, proponents of the North Carolina annexation 
system warned that without the power to annex surrounding 
territory unilaterally, annexations would be impeded and 
municipalities would lose the economic benefits of annexation.137 It 
is important to keep in mind that simply because annexees must be 
represented in the annexation procedure, equal protection principles 
do not require that these same residents be given the unilateral 
power to block the annexation. This section will discuss alternatives 
to unilateral municipal annexations that preserve constitutional 
representation and therefore do not violate Equal Protection. 
Although states must consider the needs of the state in the context 
of other state laws and the realities of municipal structure within 
their own states, this Comment ultimately recommends that states 
adopt a quasi-legislative approach, as this method allows regional 
governments to plan future growth while representing both those 
who already reside within a municipality and those who do not. 
A. Popular Determination 
Methods of popular determination allow residents or property 
owners outside the city to enter the boundaries of a surrounding city 
after having their voices heard. The appeal of this method “stems 
from a belief that property owners should have a voice in the 
dispensation of their property.”138 That the people involved in the 
annexation vote directly on the issue fosters voter participation, 
allowing the voters to act as a “check on ill-conceived and rash action 
 
 136. Cunningham v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 751 F. Supp. 885, 889 (W.D. 
Wash. 1990). 
 137. See Ubell, supra note 54, at 1653. 
 138. Palmer & Lindsey, supra note 10, at 61. 
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by municipal authority in the extension of boundaries.”139 
 
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh presents an example of this process in 
action. In the more than a century since Hunter, the Supreme Court 
has softened its Hunter language somewhat, but has never overruled 
the case.140 I do not propose overturning Hunter because the facts of 
Hunter do not implicate an impermissible denial of representation. In 
Hunter, Pennsylvania approved the annexation based on a vote of all 
residents in the proposed new boundaries.141 Because the residents 
of Pittsburgh stood to benefit significantly by the annexation, the 
odds were stacked against Allegheny politically.142 Although the 
chances of successfully blocking the annexation were small, the 
votes belonging to the residents of Allegheny were weighed equally 
with those of the residents of Pittsburgh. Therefore, there was no 
violation of Equal Protection, even under the standard that I propose 
here. A few states incorporate this type of annexation procedure in 
order to overcome minority objections to annexation.143 If the 
annexation really is in the best interest of the community, the 
democratic process will recognize this interest, and a majority of 
voters will likely approve the annexation. However, if there are 
legitimate arguments against annexation, residents of the area, 
empowered and invigorated to oppose the annexation by the promise 
of representation in the vote, may convince other voters to join their 
own votes in opposition to the annexation. In either case, those who 
have an interest in the annexation will know that their interests are 
represented, even if the outcome is ultimately adverse to those 
interests. 
The composition of the electorate in popular determination also 
presents special issues. As argued above, a vote including only the 
residents of the annexing city would create an unconstitutional 
denial of representation to the potential annexees, yet certain voting 
structures denying the vote to residents of the annexing municipality 
 
 139. SENGSTOCK, supra note 11, at 18. 
 140. See Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978). 
 141. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 174–75 (1907). 
 142. Id. at 171 (quoting the statement of plaintiffs in error: “The larger city was almost 
unanimously in favor of annexing the smaller. The smaller city was almost as strongly opposed 
to such annexation.”). 
 143. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-40-303 (1987); IOWA CODE § 368.19 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 9-4-4.9 (2004); see also Babb & Unger, supra note 6, at 66. 
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could also implicate the same constitutional problems.144 
Additionally, allowing for popular determination by only annexees 
allows a minority “oblivious to the needs of a metropolitan 
area . . . to stifle progress.”145 Therefore, the best approach is to 
allow for an electorate composed of residents of the proposed new 
municipal boundaries to vote on the issue, thus avoiding 
constitutional issues while preventing a minority from blocking a 
change that is in the best interest of the region. 
Furthermore, the very process of voting can be cumbersome and 
expensive. A city may need to meet certain statutory requirements, 
followed by a petition which must demonstrate interest, only then to 
be followed by a popular vote that will require disseminating 
information to voters.146 Because an election is involved, a city may 
have to wait for another election cycle before an annexation can 
realistically occur, even if there is popular support and the factors 
urging the need for annexation press for quicker movement on the 
issue. Besides the amount of time required for an election, elections 
are increasingly costly to administer.147 Drafting and printing 
informational brochures and ballots, and staffing elections all cost 
money. Local interests may pour vast amounts of money into an 
election, further raising the overall economic cost of making a 
decision. 
B. Legislative Determination 
A system of legislative determination almost certainly would not 
violate Equal Protection because the decision to annex is made by a 
group that represents the residents of the entire state, including the 
residents of the annexing city and residents of the annexation area. 
Legislative determination provides several benefits for states whose 
municipal functions, size, and culture allow for fewer changes to 
municipal boundaries. Because the legislature makes the final 
 
 144. These problems would not arise in every case. A system that allows the annexing 
municipality to initiate the annexation and then presents the proposal to the annexees for a vote 
would involve representation of both parties. Furthermore, incorporating additional territory 
into municipal boundaries arguably has a much less significant impact for the residents of the 
annexing city. 
 145. SENGSTOCK, supra note 11. 
 146. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE. § 35.13.015–120 (2012). 
 147. Patrick Malone, Local Election Costs on the Rise, COLORADOAN.COM (Oct. 12, 2012), 
http://www.coloradoan.com/article/20121012/NEWS01/310120037/Local-election-costs-rise. 
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decision, the interests of the state as a whole are represented in the  
 
boundary change. Those broader interests can override the narrow 
interests of a few parties who may block the annexation. 
On the other hand, this method can be cumbersome, especially 
in larger states that do not have a long history of stable municipal 
boundaries. The legislature’s advantage in representation across the 
state also results in a tendency of the legislature to act slowly in 
response to the particularized needs of small communities.148 In 
home rule jurisdictions, which are founded on the principle of local 
self-determination, giving the legislature control over boundary 
changes defeats the purpose of home rule.149 
C. Quasi-Legislative or County Determination 
Handing the final decision-making power to an entity that 
represents all residents of the annexation area can alleviate some of 
the difficulties of a popular vote while satisfying constitutional 
requirements. In this method a regional entity that approves 
boundary changes represent the residents of the region on a one 
person, one vote basis. For example, the Portland area Metro is made 
up of districts of roughly equal population spanning several 
municipalities.150 If Oregon were to give Metro the power to approve 
municipal boundary changes,151 then any decisions made by Metro 
would represent the will of the region consistent with one person, 
one vote. 
When a governmental body delegates decision-making power to 
an administrative agency, individual influence over the 
administrative agency is diluted, but it is diluted equally for all 
constituent citizens, thus avoiding equal protection problems. For 
instance, if an administrative body has been given the power to make 
an assessment on a property, and an individual disagrees with the 
assessment, there is some—albeit diluted—recourse through the 
 
 148. See SENGSTOCK, supra note 11, at 12. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Council District Map, METRO, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/index.cfm/go/by.web/id=1124 
(last visited Sept. 12, 2013). 
 151. Metro is already responsible for the area’s urban growth boundaries. Urban Growth 
Boundary, METRO, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/index.cfm/go/by.web/id/277 (last visited Sept. 
12, 2013). 
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process of representation.152 The citizen may complain to his 
representative armed with the influence of his vote. The 
representative may then vote to modify the agency’s power153 or 
constituents may vote for a new executive who will appoint directors 
with views more in line with voters’ views.154 The line of authority 
derives from the citizen through his ability to elect representatives, 
through the representative and her ability to modify the agency, and 
then to the agency itself. 
Some states may be able to apply this method on a state-wide 
level, while others may need to focus on smaller, regional 
applications. Alaska’s procedure provides a good example of a 
system that represents statewide interests in municipal boundary 
change.155 Alaska’s method of appointing representatives to its Local 
Boundary Commission based on Alaska’s judicial districts ensures 
that regional interests are represented and “that arguments for and 
against proposals to create or alter municipal governments are 
analyzed objectively, [while taking] area-wide and statewide needs 
into consideration.”156 The system is well suited for Alaska’s 
relatively small population and frontier character, but may not be 
appropriate in most states. A system similar to California’s, which 
gives discretionary approval power to regional committees, may be 
an option for other states whose size makes a statewide system 
impracticable.157 
Quasi-legislative methods are not without complications; they 
add “another layer of government that costs time and money.”158 In 
cash-strapped states, it may be difficult to justify funding for a 
 
 152. For an explanation of the various methods that elected officials have to guide and 
control administrative agencies on the federal level as well as the benefits and challenges 
associated with these methods, see R. Douglas Arnold, Political Control of Administrative Officials, 
3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279 (1987). 
 153. Id. at 280. 
 154. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 231–36 (2012), 
available at http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/drupal/system/files/4.10_2012.pdf (demonstrating 
the variety of political appointments to administrative agencies made by governors in all fifty 
states). 
 155. See supra notes 27–31. 
 156. Boundary Commission, Division of Community and Regional Affairs, STATE OF ALASKA, 
http://www.commerce.state.ak.us/dca/lbc/lbc.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2013). 
 157. See supra notes 32–34. 
 158. Palmer & Lindsey, supra note 10, at 64. 
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function that many other states leave to already-existing levels of 
government. States can avoid some of these issues by giving greater 
authority to already-existing government bodies. One obvious choice 
is the county. 
In nearly all states, residents of a municipal corporation are also 
subject to county laws and regulations.159 Although historically 
considered administrative arms of state policy and services, counties 
have increased their law and policy-making roles in recent years to 
address concerns of growing metropolitan areas.160 County 
government structure varies between mixes of elected and appointed 
commissions, councils, and administrators with varying degrees of 
legislative and executive power,161 but in all cases, elected county 
officials must represent the interests of county residents on the 
principle of one person, one vote.162 Therefore, in many cases, it 
may be appropriate for the county to approve municipal boundary 
changes. Being concerned with the health and prosperity of the 
county as a whole, county governments are well-equipped to 
evaluate the often-competing, long-term plans of all the 
municipalities within the county. The county government would be 
able to approve annexations against the will of the residents of the 
annexation area when the annexation benefits the county as a whole, 
including the individual municipalities within the county. 
Counties may not provide an adequate means of municipal 
boundary management in all cases, especially when a metropolitan area 
spans more than one county. In these cases, regional governments 
similar to Portland’s Metro government or Minneapolis’ Metropolitan 
Council could take on responsibilities to approve annexations since they 
already engage in regional planning activities.163 These governments 
 
 159. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note103, at 12. 
 160. Id. at 10. 
 161. Overview of County Government, NACO, http://www.naco.org/Counties/learn/Pages/Overview.aspx 
(last visited Sept. 12, 2013). 
 162. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
 163. See Urban Development and Revitalization, METRO, 
http://www.oregonmetro.gov/index.cfm/go/by.web/id=26 (last visited Sept. 12, 2013); About the 
Metropolitan Council, METROPOLITAN COUNCIL, http://www.metrocouncil.org/About-Us.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2013). Portland’s Metro in fact already establishes urban growth boundaries for 
the region, approving the proposals for expansion for the municipalities within Metro’s 
boundaries. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note103, at 12. I do not necessarily mean to imply 
that this would be the best course of action in Indiana, but only to point out that regional 
governments are or can be equipped to handle the task of approving municipal boundary 
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would presumably be under the same one-person, one-vote 
requirements as Avery, and so the principle of proportional 
representation would be preserved in annexation decisions.164 
Giving annexation authority to counties or regional governments 
not only helps solve Equal Protection problems, but it also helps 
address other difficulties associated with annexations, particularly 
municipal underbounding.165 Municipal underbounding refers to the 
problem in which municipalities refuse to annex unincorporated 
urban areas, leaving the area without adequate municipal services.166 
This situation occurs in part because municipalities normally seek to 
annex territories that will increase tax revenues at a rate greater than 
the costs of providing services.167 Giving municipalities the 
unilateral decision-making power in annexations creates a perverse 
incentive to annex areas most likely to generate revenue yet least in 
need of municipal services, while refusing to annex areas that are 
most in need of city services.168 By giving counties a more important 
role in the annexation process, metropolitan growth policy can 
account for the interests of residents outside municipal borders, who 
would benefit from annexation and accompanying municipal 
services, over the interests of the city. This approach would further 
aid intelligent municipal growth.169 
Based on these considerations, states should strongly consider 
giving annexation power to counties or some other regional or 
statewide authority. While this method may not work in every 
circumstance, quasi-legislative power addresses the constitutional 
concerns about representation without sacrificing efficiency. 
 
changes. 
 164. See Cunningham v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 751 F. Supp. 885, 888 (W.D. 
Wash. 1990). The Minneapolis Metropolitan Council is appointed by the governor from among 
sixteen population districts. METROPOLITAN COUNCIL, supra note 163. However, this does not 
create a problem because the residents of the metropolitan area elected the governor, and the 
state is free to appoint representatives as long as they do not serve in their appointed capacity as 
a result of another elected position. See Cunningham, 751 F. Supp. at 891–93. 
 165. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931, 
937–40 (2010). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 957. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 980–81. 
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D. Judicial Determination 
The judicial determination method for annexations probably 
does not violate Equal Protection. Because judges are normally 
appointed by the executive branch or elected by residents,170 judges 
represent the state as a whole. However, judicial determination 
presents special problems from a policy perspective. Courts are 
generally ill-equipped to make the sort of difficult policy decisions 
that inhere in municipal annexation and are unable to consider fully 
future growth patterns, fiscal concerns, and the diverse needs of a 
city’s or county’s residents.171 Further, such decisions are inherently 
legislative, not interpretive, and are conceptually at odds with the 
efforts of most states to maintain a strict separation of powers and 
functions between the three branches of government. This option is 
unsatisfactory in most states. 
V. DESIRABILITY OF CHANGE IN SPITE OF SIMILAR RESULTS 
My proposal raises at least one important question: if unilateral 
annexations can be replaced by other methods that allow for the 
annexation without the direct consent of the annexees, what purpose 
is there in requiring states to change annexation methods to a 
different form yielding the same result? 
First, although annexations without consent could go forward 
under alternative methods, state policies have an effect on the size of 
annexations.172 Where cities must work with a boundary agency, 
cities generally annex smaller portions of land.173 By forcing cities to 
seriously consider which areas will be brought into their boundaries, 
cities will have less incentive to simply grab as much land as possible 
for tax purposes and plan how to provide city services later. 
Furthermore, by giving more authority to a regional power, growth 
policies can consider and accommodate regional needs. 
 
 170. Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/fact_sheet.authcheckdam.p
df (last visited Sept. 12, 2013). 
 171. SENGSTOCK, supra note 11, at 32. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) 
(addressing the federal high court’s inadequacy in dealing with policy decisions that are non-
justiciable political questions). 
 172. Mary M. Edwards, Municipal Annexation: Does State Policy Matter?, 28 LAND USE POL’Y 
325, 331 (2011) (finding that there is a statistically significant, although counterintuitive, 
relationship between annexation methods and the number, frequency, and size of annexations). 
 173. Id. 
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Second, even if the frequency and size of annexations do not 
change as a result of prohibiting unilateral annexations, local 
democracy can function more smoothly if the governed perceive at 
least some level of power and accountability in local government. 
That is, political participation has its own merits. “[T]he 
psychological satisfaction of sharing in governmental decisions 
cannot be summarily dismissed as immaterial.”174 In the early days 
of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville noted that American 
municipalities, especially the townships of New England, were 
fundamentally different from European municipalities in part 
because the townships claimed and respected the wisdom of each of 
their citizens.175 The unique relationship between citizen and local 
government helped mold better citizens and foment better 
government:  
It is in the town, amidst the ordinary relationships of life, that the 
desire for esteem . . . and the thirst for power and notoriety 
come to be concentrated; these passions, which so often roil 
society, change in character when they find a vent close to home, in 
the bosom, as it were, of the family.176  
The practice of unilateral annexation robs the annexee of this crucial 
sense of participation, thus alienating him from his local 
government. How can the annexee enthusiastically participate in a 
government into which he was brought not only against his will, but 
also without his voice? As de Tocqueville implied, this resentment 
for government may in turn affect democratic participation in state 
and federal levels of government as well.177 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although some states have recently done away with their 
municipal annexation provisions, several other states still rely 
heavily on annexation methods that raise serious questions about 
their constitutionality under principles of equal protection. Such 
annexations provide extra protections for those already within 
municipal boundaries and deny representation concerning a crucial 
 
 174. SENGSTOCK, supra note 11, at 17. 
 175. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 75 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2004) 
(1835). 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. 
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decision to those who, through the annexation, suddenly become 
subject to a variety of new ordinances and regulations. As this 
Comment has shown, a variety of alternatives allow municipalities to 
control and manage growth in an intelligent manner without denying 
representation to those who are most affected by the boundary 
change. By shifting responsibility for approving municipal growth to 
a regional or county government, issues inherent in urban growth can 
be addressed without violating the residents’ rights to representation in 
local government. In this way, state systems can demonstrate 
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